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Abstract
In this paper, we endogenize the timing of policymaking in a simple two-country model
of strategic environmental policy. We consider a timing game in which two policymak-
ers non-cooperatively decide their preferred sequence of moves before setting emission tax
rates. We show that whether the policymakers implement emission tax policies simultane-
ously or sequentially crucially depends on the magnitude of environmental damages: When
the damages are insignicant, the tax rates are strategic substitutes and the simultaneous-
move policymaking emerges in equilibrium. In contrast, when the damages are signicant,
the tax rates are strategic complements and the sequential-move policymaking emerges. In
addition, we extend the model by allowing for dierences in the vulnerability to environ-
mental damages between countries. When the dierences are large, the unique equilibrium
of the game is the situation where the less vulnerable country acts as a leader. In the case
where multiple equilibrium emerges, the risk dominant equilibrium is also that the less
vulnerable country leads.
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1 Introduction
The literature on strategic environmental policy has shown that governments may distort their
environmental policies due to strategic reasons. In some cases, governments may implement
too lax environmental policies for the purpose of shifting prots from foreign to domestic rms
(known as ecological dumping) or for the purpose of bolstering other countries' eorts to reduce
transboundary pollutions (known as free-riding). In other cases, governments may implement
too stringent policies for the purpose of shifting pollution to foreign countries (known as Not In
My Backyard: NIMBY). These dierent possibilities imply that policymakers should take into
account the strategic interdependencies carefully when deciding on the stringency of domestic
environmental regulations.
However, the challenge for policymakers is not only to determine the desirable level of
regulation but also to determine the desirable timing of moves in their policymaking. It
is important for policymakers to consider whether they should set their preferred level of
environmental regulation before or after policymakers in other countries do. This is because
alternate order of moves in policymaking often gives rise to signicantly dierent results.1
Nevertheless, almost all the literature on strategic environmental policy has not considered the
importance of the timing issues. In particular, previous studies generally assume exogenously
given simultaneous-move policymaking (Conrad 1993; Barrett 1994; Kennedy 1994; Simpson
and Bradford 1996; Greaker 2003; Roelfsema 2007).
In this paper, we extend the standard model of strategic environmental policy by endo-
genizing the timing of decisions made by policymakers. We analyze the following positive
and normative questions. First, we address the normative question of whether policymakers
should act as a leader or a follower in their policymaking. Second, adopting the endogenous
timing game proposed by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), we determine the endogenous order of
moves in policymaking in a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE). This endogenous timing of
environmental policymaking enables us to answer the positive question of which is the most
appropriate timing of moves, either simultaneous or sequential policymaking. Third, we ad-
dress the normative question of whether their timing of policymaking should be coordinated
or not. Finally, since the endogenous timing game may have multiple SPEs, we solve the
coordination issue that appears as equilibrium selection problem by resorting the concepts of
risk-dominance oered by Harsanyi and Selten (1988).2 Applying this concept, we answer the
positive question of what type of country eventually acts as a leader regarding environmental
policymaking.
To address the issues, we consider a three-stage game involving two countries (policymakers)
making decision on emission taxes and two polluting rms producing a homogenous product
and selling them in a world market. In the rst stage of the game, the policymakers simul-
taneously and non-cooperatively state which role (leading or following) regarding subsequent
policymaking it prefers. In the second stage, policymakers non-cooperatively determine their
1Since the seminal studies by Gal-Or (1985) and Dowrick (1986), the industrial organization literature has
pointed out the importance of the timing of moves (whether there is a rst- or second-mover advantage) in
many types of games.
2The same procedure for equilibrium selection in the endogenous timing literature is used in the context of
price leadership in Bertrand competition (van Damme and Hurkens 2004; Amir and Stepanova 2006), in the
context of capital tax competition (Kempf and Rota-Graziosi 2010a), and in private provision of public goods
(Kempf and Rota-Graziosi 2010b).
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emission tax rates. Whether the timing of moves in the second stage is simultaneously or
sequentially is determined according to the solution of the rst stage. In the third stage, rms
simultaneously choose a quantity to produce, and the production process causes transboundary
pollution.
We show that the slope of marginal environmental damage curve (hereafter we call it as the
damage parameter or the vulnerability to environmental damages ) is crucial for determining
the endogenous timing of moves in environmental policymaking. When the damage parameters
in both countries are smaller than a certain level, policymakers' choices about tax rates are
strategic substitutes. In this case, both policymakers can enjoy a rst-mover advantage and
the simultaneous policymaking (Nash policymaking game) is the SPE of the timing game.
In contrast, when the damage parameters are larger, tax rates are strategic complements.
In this case, both policymakers can enjoy a second-mover advantage and the two sequential
policymaking situations (Stackelberg policymaking games) are the SPEs of the timing game.
The result contributes to the literature on strategic environmental policy by demonstrating
the importance of considering the sequential-move policymaking. In addition, we show that in
the strategic complements case, both countries are better o (i.e., attain Pareto-improvement)
by coordinating their timing decisions in a way that their policies are set sequentially instead
of simultaneously.
We then extend the model by allowing for dierences in vulnerability to environmental dam-
ages (or equivalently dierences in the damage parameter) between countries. The extension
enables us to predict which country will act as a leader (i.e., the endogenous order of moves).
We show that under certain condition, the unique SPE of the timing game is the Stackelberg
policymaking where the less vulnerable country acts as a leader. However, the reverse, a situ-
ation where the more vulnerable country acts as a leader, is never a SPE. Furthermore, in the
case where there exists multiple SPEs of the timing game that correspond to the two Stack-
elberg situations, we apply the concept of risk-dominance as dened by Harsnyi and Selten
(1988) to select among SPEs. We show that the equilibrium in which the policymaker in the
less vulnerable country acts as a leader will be the risk-dominant equilibrium.
Our study closely relates to Bacena-Ruiz (2006), which investigates endogenous timing in
policymaking using a strategic environmental policy model. He nds that whether governments
set environmental taxes sequentially or simultaneously crucially depends on the degree of
pollution spillovers.3 The dierences between our study and Bacena-Ruiz (2006) is as follows.
First, our study shows that the results of endogenous timing depend not only on the degree of
pollution spillovers but also on the magnitude of environmental damages.4 Second, our study
allows for the dierence in the vulnerability to environmental damages between countries so
that we can identify which country is likely to be a leader whereas Bacena-Ruiz (2006) considers
only symmetric equilibria for identical countries. Finally, our study address the coordination
issue on the timing decisions of policymakers (i.e., the equilibrium selection problem).5
3In particular, Bacena-Ruiz (2006) shows that taxes are strategic complements and both the leader and the
follower obtain greater welfare than under a simultaneous tax setting if the pollution spillovers are low enough.
Thus, in this case, governments set taxes sequentially. On the other hand, if the pollution spillovers are high
enough, taxes are strategic substitutes and governments set taxes simultaneously.
4Barcena-Ruiz (2006) xes the slope of marginal environmental damage curve at unity.
5Fujiwara (2009) also investigate the endogenous timing in a two-country oligopolistic model with trans-
boundary pollution. He shows that the equilibrium timing is crucially aected by the degree of transboundary
pollution and marginal environmental damages. Our study diers from Fujiwara (2009) in some important as-
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic structure of the model. Sec-
tion 3 derives the equilibria of simultaneous and sequential policymaking games and compares
them. Stage 4 determines the SPEs of the timing game. In section 5, we extend the model by
incorporating heterogeneity in damage parameters between countries and determine the SPEs.
In addition, we solve the coordination issue regarding multiple SPEs by using the concept of
risk-dominance. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Basic Model
Consider two countries labeled by i (i = 1; 2). In each country, there is one representative rm.
Emitting transboundary pollution, each rm i (i = 1; 2) produces homogenous products (qi)
and sells them in a world market a la Cournot. We assume that one unit of output generates
one unit of emission. Then, the prot function of rm i is given by:
i = p(Q)qi   tiqi; (1)
where p(Q) is the inverse demand of the world market, Q = q1+q2 is the total output produced
by the two rms, ti is the rate of emission tax or subsidy in country i.6 The inverse demand is
assumed to be linear as p(Q) = 1  q1   q2. The social welfare function of country i is dened
as:
Wi = i + tiqi  

D(qi) + D(qj)

; (2)
where D() is the environmental damage function and the parameter  2 [0; 1] represents the
degree of transboundary pollution.7 The environmental damage is assumed to be quadratic
as D(qi) = d2
 
qi
2, where the parameter d, which we call it as the damage parameter or the
vulnerability to environmental damages, represents the slope of the marginal environmental
damage curve and is assumed to be the same between two countries. The assumption will be
relaxed in section 6.
The model has three stages. In the rst stage, the policymaker of each country non-
cooperatively chooses its preferred order of moves (either leads or follows). Once the order of
moves has been dened, policymakers act accordingly in the second stage. That is, policymak-
ers non-cooperatively set their emission tax (or subsidy) rates according to the order of moves
selected in the rst stage. In the third stage, each rm decides its output simultaneously.8
pects: (1) Furjiwara (20090 assumes environmental damages to be linear whereas we assume them to be convex
(which is the standard assumption in environmental regulation literature). (2) Fujiwara (2009)'s model speci-
cation produces only the strategic substitutability of environmental tax rates. Thus, the possibility of multiple
sequential-move equilibria is provided just by the dierence in the shape of iso-welfare curves between countries.
(3) Fujiwara (2009) does not consider the question of which country chooses to be a leader (or follower).
6For simplicity, we assume that marginal production costs equal zero.
7This type of transboundary pollution is employed by Roelfsema (2007) and Hattori (2010). The parameter
 2 [0; 1] can be considered as altruistic preference of policymakers for environmental damages that happen
in other countries. In addition, following some earlier studies on strategic environmental policy (e.g., Conrad
1993; Barrett 1994; Greaker 2003; Roelfsema 2007), we excludes consumers' surplus from the denition of social
welfare. This assumption can be justied if countries are small so that the domestic consumption is suciently
small when compared to world consumption.
8We do not consider the endogenous timing of two rms' moves because it is obvious in our setting. In a
simple Cournot model with homogeneous products and homogenous production costs, the rms' outputs are
known to be strategic substitutes. Therefore, the simultaneous timing can be supported as an equilibrium by
applying the timing game of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990).
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3 Simultaneous and Sequential Policymakings
The model is solved backwards. In the third stage, each rm simultaneously chooses its output,
taking as given both the rival rm's output and the emission tax rates set by governments.
From the rst-order conditions of prot maximization, we have qi(ti; tj) = (1  2ti + tj)=2 for
i = 1; 2 and i 6= j, which indicate @qi=@ti < 0 and @qi=@tj > 0.
In the second stage, policymakers decide on emission tax rates simultaneously or sequen-
tially. We refer the simultaneous-move and the sequential-move situations as Nash policymaking
game and Stackelberg policymaking game, respectively.
3.1 Nash policymaking game in the second stage
We then derive the second-stage equilibrium in a case where emission tax rates are chosen
simultaneously by two governments. From the rst-order condition of the welfare maximization
problem of policymaker i, we have the following reaction function of policymaker i:
ti = Ri(tj) =
d(2  )  1
d(4 + ) + 4
+

2d(1 + )  1
d(4 + ) + 4

tj : (3)
Lemma 1 Tax rates are strategic substitutes (complements) when d < (>) 12(1+) .
The reaction function of policymaker i is downward (upward) sloping R0i < 0 (R
0
i > 0) when the
slope of the marginal environmental damage curve is at (steep).9 The intuition is as follows.
On the one hand, an increase in tj shifts production and emission from country j to country
i by increasing qi and decreasing qj . Thus, policymaker i has an incentive to increase its tax
rates to refrain rm i's emission. On the other hand, because  @2(p(Q)qi)=@ti@tj = 1=9 > 0,
an increase in tj also increases rm i's marginal revenue from reducing ti. Thus, policymaker i
has an incentive to lower its tax rates to boost rm i's prots. When d is large (small) enough,
the former (latter) incentive dominate the latter (former), and thus the tax rates are strategic
complements (substitutes).
The equilibrium tax rates are obtained by solving (3) for i and j:
tN =
d(2  )  1
d(2  ) + 5 ; (4)
where the superscript N represents the equilibrium values in Nash policymaking game.10 Dif-
ferentiating tN in d and  yields:
@tN
@d
=
6(2  )
5 + d(2  )2 > 0; @t
N
@
=   6d
5 + d(2  )2 < 0:
Thus, the equilibrium tax rates in Nash policymaking game are increasing function of d and
is decreasing function of . Using the equilibrium tax (4), the equilibrium output and welfare
as:
qN =
2
5 + d(2  ) ; W
N =
2

d(1  2) + 1
d(2  ) + 52 ; (5)
and the equilibrium prots are N = (qN )2.
9It is clear that when d = 1=[2(1 + )], the tax choices of both policymakers are independent of each other.
10Since we consider a symmetric solution here, we omit subscript i.
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3.2 Stackelberg policymaking game in the second stage
We then derive the second-stage equilibrium in a case where one of the two policymakers
(referred as policymaker L) is the rst player to set its emission tax rates and then the other
policymaker (referred as policymaker F ) chooses its own tax rates.
The reaction function of policymaker F is given by (3) (replacing i by F and j byL) because
the welfare maximization of policymaker F is the same as in Nash policymaking game. In con-
trast, the welfare maximization of policymaker L, the leader, is given by maxtL WL(tL; RF (tL)).
After some mathematical manipulations, we obtain the equilibrium tax rates:
tL =
d

2d(4 + ) + d2(4 + 3)  3   1  2

; (6)
tF =
d

2d(4  2) + d2(4 + 3)  4   3  1

; (7)
where   6 + 5d(5 + 2) + 4d2(5 +    2) + d3(4 + 3) > 0.
Using (6) and (7), the equilibrium output and welfare of countries L and F are derived as:
qL =
3 + 4d(2 + ) + 2d2(2  2)

; qF =
2 + 5d(2 + ) + 2d2(2 + )

; (8)
WL =
1 + 4d+ 4d2(1     2)
22
; WF =

22
; (9)
where
  4 + d(44 + 5) + d2(156 + 34   222) + d3(196  1052   203)
+2d4

(2 + )(24  22   42 + 133)+ 4d5(4  4   2 + 63 + 4 + 5):
The equilibrium prots are L = (qL)2 and F = (qF )2, respectively.
Lemma 2 The equilibrium values of Stackelberg policymaking game must satisfy:
(a) If d < 12(1+) , then t
L < tF , qF < qL, and WF < WL.
(b) If d > 12(1+) , then t
F < tL, qL < qF , and WL < WF .
Proof. See Appendix. 
This lemma implies that if the tax rates in the second stage are strategic substitutes (com-
plements), then each country has a rst-mover advantage (second-mover advantage), which
is commonly known in the industrial organization literature (Gal-Or 1985; Dowrick 1986).11
In the case of strategic substitutes, a leader chooses lower tax rates than a follower. This is
because the leader knows that if he lowers its taxes, the follower will raise its taxes. Thus, the
leader is better o than the follower by enjoying the higher industrial prots and the free-riding
benets of environmental regulations. On the other hand, in the case of strategic complements,
a leader sets a higher tax than a follower because the leader fears that setting lower tax will
induce the follower to lower its tax. Thus, the follower is better o than the leader.
11In our study, the denitions of the rst- and second-mover advantages are following Amir and Stepanova
(2006).
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3.3 Comparison of two policymaking games
We then compare the equilibrium values in Nash policymaking game with those in Stackelberg
policymaking game. From equations (4) to (9), we obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 3 The equilibrium values of Nash and Stackelberg policymaking games must satisfy:
(a) If d < 12(1+) , then t
L < tN < tF , qF < qN < qL, and WF < WN < WL.
(b) If 12(1+) < d <
2
 , then t
N < tF < tL, qL < qN < qF , and WN < WL < WF .
(c) If d > 2 , then t
N < tF < tL, qL < qF < qN , and WN < WL < WF .
Proof. See Appendix. 
When the tax rates are strategic complements (d > 1=[2(1 + )]), the both leader's and
follower's tax rates are higher than the tax rates in Nash policymaking game (tN < tF < tL).
Therefore, both the leading and following countries are better o than in the case where they
act simultaneously (WN < WL and WN < WF ). This is because the simultaneous policy-
setting case is a prisoners' dilemma situation in which both policymakers will be better o if
they can agree to set higher tax rates. On the other hand, when the tax rates are strategic
substitutes (d > 1=[2(1 + )]), the leader enjoys rst-mover advantages implementing lower
tax rates (tF < tN ), which forces the follower to set higher tax rates (tN < tF ). Therefore,
leading country is better o and following country is worse o than in the case where they act
simultaneously (WN < WL and WN > WF ).12
Furthermore, from the comparison of the outputs under dierent equilibria, we nd the
preference relations of a policymaker and a rm on the timing of environmental policymaking.
When d < 1=[2(1 + )], both the rm and the policymaker in the same country have the
same preference order over the timing of policymaking. However, when d > 1=[2(1 + )],
their preferences conict with each other. Particularly when d > 2=, the policymakers prefer
acting as a leader or a follower rather than act simultaneously whereas the rms prefer the
policymakers to act simultaneously rather than act sequentially.
4 Timing game in the rst stage
We then investigate the endogenous timing of moves by applying the observable delay game
of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). In the rst stage, policymakers non-cooperatively choose
whether they prefer to move early or late in the second stage. Following Hamilton and Slutsky
(1990), we assume that if both policymakers choose to move early (strategy Leads) or to move
late (strategy Follows), Nash policymaking game will be enforced in the second stage. If one
policymaker chooses Leads and the other chooses Follows, Stackelberg policymaking game will
be enforced in the second stage.
Table 4 shows the normal form representation of the rst-stage game. Now we obtain the
following propositions:
12Note also that when d = 1=[2(1 + )], there are no strategic interdependencies between policymakers and
thereby tL = tF = tN , qL = qF = qN , and WL = WF = WN .
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Policymaker 2
Leads Follows
Policymaker 1
Leads WN1 ; W
N
2 W
L
1 ; W
F
2
Follows WF1 ; W
L
2 W
N
1 ; W
N
2
Table 1: Payo matrix of endogenous timing in the rst stage
Proposition 1
(a) If d < 12(1+) , then the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) of the timing game is the
Nash policymaking equilibrium.
(b) If d > 12(1+) , then the Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SPEs) of the timing game are the
two Stackelberg policymaking equilibria. In this case, moving sequentially instead of si-
multaneously is Pareto-improving for both countries.
Proof. Immediately from Table 4 and Lemma 3. 
When the damage parameter is small, strategy Leads becomes a dominant strategy for both
policymakers and there is unique SPE that corresponds to Nash policymaking games. This
is because both policymakers want to exploit a rst-mover advantage and the second-mover's
welfare are smaller than that under Nash policymaking equilibrium. In contrast, when the
damage parameter is large (equivalently, tax rates are strategic complements), there are two
possible SPEs of the timing game that correspond to the two Stackelberg situations. This is
because, in any case, both the rst- and second-mover's welfare are larger than that under
Nash policymaking game (WL > WN and WF > WN ). In addition, the two Stackelberg
policymaking equilibria are Pareto-superior to the Nash policymaking equilibrium: both poli-
cymakers have a common interest in avoiding the Nash policymaking game, and they can do
so by accepting that one of them leads environmental policymaking.13
Our results are closely related to the study by Barcena-Ruiz (2006), which examines en-
dogenous timing in policymaking in a model of strategic environmental policy. In his study,
the damage parameter d is assumed to be xed (d = 1) and thereby the results of endogenous
timing in policymaking are characterized only by the degree of transboundary pollution. He
shows that when the transboundary spillovers are low (high) enough, in equilibrium of the
timing game, policymakers set taxes sequentially (simultaneously). These results hold in our
model as well: when  is small (large), the tax rates are likely to be strategic complements (sub-
stitutes), and thereby policymakers are more likely to move sequentially (simultaneously). Not
only that, our study shows that the magnitude of the damage parameter aects the strategic
relationship between policymakers and thereby the outcome of endogenous timing of moves.
13When d = 1=[2(1+ )], then any possible order of moves are SPEs of the timing game because there are no
strategic interdependencies between players. In this case, the policymakers do not care whether they act as a
leader or a follower.
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5 Heterogenous Environmental Damages
In this section, we extend the basic model by incorporating heterogeneity in damage parameters
(or vulnerability to environmental damages) between countries. This extension enables us to
examine the endogenous order of moves, i.e., which countries, either less or more vulnerable
country, chooses to move rst.
The welfare in country i is now dened as
cWi = i + tiqi   Di(qi) + Dj(qj); (10)
where
Di(qi) =
di
2
(qi)2
Here, the damage parameter di is not necessarily the same between the countries (i.e., we allow
for di 6= dj). Obviously, the case of d1 = d2 is equivalent to the symmetric case analyzed in
the previous sections. To have a meaningful analysis, we exclude the possibility that there are
extremely large dierences between di and dj .14
In this section, we particularly focus on the endogenous order of moves in policymaking.
Therefore, we do not exhibit and compare the equilibrium tax rates, outputs, and prots but
only the welfare. In addition, because the derivation is similar to that engaged by the previous
sections, we omit the detailed derivations here.
The reaction functions in Nash policymaking game is given by:
ti =
2di   dj   2
4di + dj + 4
+

2(di + dj)  1
4di + dj + 4

tj ; (11)
which indicates that the tax rates are strategic substitutes (complements) when di < (>
) 1 2dj2 .
After some tedious mathematical derivations, we obtain the equilibrium welfare of coun-
try i in Nash policymaking game and that of leading and following countries in Stackelberg
policymaking game as cWNi , cWLi , and cWFi , respectively (these values are shown in Appendix).
Then, we have the following comparison results.
Lemma 4 The equilibrium welfare of Nash and Stackelberg policymaking games must satisfy:
(a) cWFi R cWNi if di R 1 2dj2 .
(b) cWLi = cWNi if di = 1 2dj2 , and cWLi > cWNi if otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix. 
Notice that we do not compare cWLi with cWFi because the comparison is fairly complex and
it does not aect the results of endogenous order of moves in the rst stage. We now state the
following proposition:
14The dierences in di can be interpreted as dierences in the level of technology for emission abatement
or pollution adaptation between countries: if a country has the superior (inferior) technology, then one unit
of emission imposes lesser (greater) environmental costs on society. Therefore, di < dj describes the situation
where country i has a relatively superior emission abatement or adaptation technology than country j.
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Figure 1: SPEs of the timing game: the case of heterogenous environmental damages.
Proposition 2
(a) If di <
1 2dj
2 holds for i = 1; 2, then SPE of the timing game is the simultaneous (Nash)
moves situation.
(b) If di <
1 2dj
2 and dj >
1 2di
2 hold, then SPE of the timing game is the sequential
(Stackelberg) moves situation in which policymaker i leads and policymaker j follows.
(c) If di >
1 2dj
2 holds for i = 1; 2, then SPEs of the timing game is the sequential (Stackel-
berg) moves situation. That is, (Leads; Follows) and (Follows; Leads) are both SPEs
of the timing game.
Proof. Immediately from Lemma 4. 
There is a unique SPE of the timing game that corresponds to Nash policymaking game in
the second stage when the environmental damages are insignicant in both countries(assertion
(a)) while there are two possible SPEs that correspond to two Stackelberg policymaking games
when they are signicant (assertion (c)). The novel nding is that there is a unique SPE where
Stackelberg policymaking emerges when there are relatively large dierences in the damage
parameter. Proposition 2-(b) implies that a policymaker in a country with relatively small
(large) damage parameter is more likely to become a leader (follower), but the converse does not
hold. In other words, ceteris paribus, a policymaker in the less vulnerable country will become a
leader in policymaking. Figure 1 illustrates the SPEs of the timing game in three cases:  = 0,
 = 0:5, and  = 1. In the gure, d1 = (1  2d2)=2 and d2 = (1  2d1)=2 lines are depicted
in (d1; d2) plane. The d1 = d2 (45-degree) line is shown as dashed one. P1 (P2) indicates the
policymaker 1 (2), respectively. The region labeled by \Multiple Stackelberg" represents the
region where there are two SPEs that correspond to two Stackelberg policymaking situations
but the exact order of moves are undetermined. It shows that the smaller , the larger the
region in which the order of moves is unambiguously determined.
We then move onto the issue of coordination, that is, the issue of how to select one of the two
possible SPEs. In order to solve the issue, we employ the concept of risk-dominance criterion
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Figure 2: Risk dominance: the value of the product of deviation losses (d1 = 1)
dened by Harsanyi and Selten (1988).15 In our framework with heterogenous damage param-
eter (or heterogenous vulnerability to environmental damages), equilibrium (Leads; Follows)
(policymaker 1 leads and policymaker 2 follows) risk-dominates equilibrium (Follows; Leads)
if the former is associated with the larger product of deviation losses  . Specically, the
condition is:
    cWL1  cWN1  cWF2  cWN2    cWF1  cWN1  cWL2  cWN2  > 0:
However, the conditions for the above inequality to hold are analytically very dicult to derive.
Therefore, we engage numerical analysis carried out by a computer program16 and derive the
conditions summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 3 If d1 < d2, then   > 0. Thus, the equilibrium in which a policymaker in
a country with relatively smaller (larger) damage parameter acts as a leader (follower) risk-
dominates the equilibrium in which a policymaker in a country with relatively smaller (larger)
di acts as a follower (leader).
This proposition reinforces the result in Proposition 2: a policymaker in the less (more)
vulnerable country tends to become a leader (follower). Figure 2 conrms the results, oering
some illustrations of   in the case of d2 = 1. In the gure, all curves cross the horizontal axis
at the same point (d1 = d2), and the value of   must be positive when d1 < d2. We nd that
the larger the value of , the greater the deviation losses, and thereby the more likely that the
situation where less vulnerable country leads is a safer equilibrium.
15The denition of the risk-dominance is that an equilibrium risk-dominates another equilibrium when the
former is less risky than the latter, that is, the risk-dominant equilibrium is the one for which the product of
the deviation losses is the largest.
16The numerical analyses are performed in Mathematica 7.0. The code is available upon request.
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6 Concluding Remarks
Policymakers need to consider not only how but also when to implement policies in any kind
of policymaking. In this paper, we extend the standard model of strategic environmental
policy by endogenizing the timing of decisions made by policymakers. Three main results
are obtained: (1) Whether the policymakers implement emission tax policies simultaneously
or sequentially crucially depends on the magnitude of environmental damages: When the
damages are insignicant, the tax rates are strategic substitutes. In this case, the simultaneous
policymaking is the unique SPE of the timing game. When the damages are signicant, the tax
rates are strategic complements, and the sequential policymaking situations are the two SPEs of
the timing game. (2) When the dierences in the magnitude of environmental damages between
countries are large, the unique SPE is that the less (more) vulnerable country leads (follows).
(3) A risk dominance criterion selects the equilibrium where the less (more) vulnerable country
leads (follows). Because a conventional approach in the strategic environmental policy model
is to consider a simultaneous-move policymaking, these results contribute to the literature by
demonstrating the importance of considering the sequential-move policymaking.
We have used the simplest possible model that can identify the endogenous timing in envi-
ronmental policymaking. However, our main results are likely to be robust to dierent policy
instruments and to dierent competition mode (Bertrand). Hattori (2010) derives policy-
maker's strategic relationships in their policymaking for dierent policy instruments and for
dierent competition mode in a similar model to ours. In particular, emission taxes are neces-
sarily strategic complements in Bertrand competition case whereas emission caps (standards)
are necessarily strategic substitutes in both Cournot and Bertrand cases. From these strategic
relationships indicated by Hattori (2010), we can expect the results of endogenous timing for
each case: The strategic substitutability (complementarity) case will lead to the simultaneous-
(sequential-)move policymaking.17
In this paper, we assume that domestic consumption is suciently small compared to world
consumption and thereby do not include any consumer surplus into policymakers' objective.
One interesting extension of our model is to consider what happens when either one or both
countries have a large domestic market. In this case, a policymaker in a country with large
market will care for the domestic consumer surplus when setting domestic environmental poli-
cies. This extension will enable us to examine which country (either large or small) acts as a
leader regarding environmental policymaking. This awaits future research.
Appendix
Proof for Lemmas 2 and 3
Comparing (6) with (7), we have
tL   tF = (1 + d)

2d(1 + )  1

R 0 , d R 1
2(1 + )
:
17However, the result in the issue of coordination in the case of multiple SPEs may dier from ours, but this
is left for future research.
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In addition, from (8) and (9), we have
qL   qF = (1 + d)

1  2d(1 + )

R 0 , d Q 1
2(1 + )
;
WL  WF = (1 + d)
2

2 + d(9 + 5 + 6d+ 24d)

22

1  2d(1 + ) R 0 , d Q 1
2(1 + )
;
which proves Lemma 2.
Next, comparing (4) with (6) and (7), we have
tL   tN = (1 + d)

4 + d(4 + )

5 + d(2 + )



2d(1 + )  1] R 0 , d R 1
2(1 + )
;
tF   tN =  (1 + d)

2d(1 + )  12
5 + d(2 + )


 0;
which proves that tL < tN < tF holds for d < 1=[2(1 + )] and tN < tF < tL holds for
d > 1=[2(1 + )]. In addition, from (5), (8), and (9), we have
qL   qN = (3 + 2d)(1 + d)

1  2d(1 + )
5 + d(2 + )


R 0 , d Q 1
2(1 + )
;
qF   qN = (1 + d)(2  d)

2d(1 + )  1
5 + d(2 + )


> (<) 0 if
1
2(1 + )
< d <
2

(if otherwise);
WL  WN = (1 + d)
2

2d(1 + )  12
2

5 + d(2 + )
22  0;
WF  WN = (1 + d)
2[4 + d(4 + )] 

2

5 + d(2 + )
22 2d(1 + )  1 R 0 , d R 12(1 + ) ;
where

  11 + 4d(13 + 6) + d2(40 + 5   122) + 2d3(4     2 + 3) > 0:
This completes the proof of Lemma 3. 
Proof for Lemma 4
Using (11), after solving for the various stages, we obtain the following equilibrium welfare of
country i (i = 1; 2, i 6= j):
cWNi =

2 + 8dj + 4d2j (2 + ) + 2di

1 + d2j (1  )(2 + )2
+dj(4  4   32)
  2d2i dj(2 + )2


5 + 2dj(3 + ) + di(6 + 4dj + 2   2dj)
2 (A1)
cWLi = 1 + 4dj1 + dj   di(1 + )23d2i dj + 43 + 2dj(4 + 2dj + )+ 2di9 + 6 + 4dj(3 + dj +    2) (A2)cWFi = 
23d2i dj + 43 + 2dj(4 + 2di + )+ 2di9 + 6 + 4dj(3 + dj +    2) ; (A3)
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where

  4 + dj
h
24 + (5  16d4i ) + 2dj(3 + )(6 + 5)
i
+di
h
20 + 23d3j (6 + 5) + 8dj(11     42) + d2j (84 + 64   252   43)
i
+4d3i
h
4  8dj( 1 + 2 + 2) + d2j (4  2 + 43)
i
+4d2i
h
8 + d3j
3(2 +    2) + 4dj(6  4   52   3)
+d2j (16 + 6   72 + 83 + 44)
i
:
Comparing cWFi with cWNi , we have
cWFi  cWNi = 	22di + 2dj   1 R 0 , di R 1  2dj2 ;
where
 
h
5 + 2dj(3 + ) + di

2(3 + ) + dj(4  2)
i2
> 0
 
h
6 + 4d2i (2 + dj) + dj(9 + 6) + di

3d2j + 4(4 + ) + 4dj(3 +    2)
i2
> 0
	  (4 + 4di + dj)
h
1 + 2di(1 + ) + didj(2 + )
i
h
11 + dj(42 + 40) + 4dj2(9 + 15 + 52) + 2di3dj

14 + 6 + dj(8 + 2   2)

+di

32 + 6 43dj3| {z }
y1
+dj(88 + 115 + 272) + dj2(48 + 100 + 402   63)

+di2

4(5 + ) 23dj3(2     2)| {z }
y2
+dj(40 + 92 + 442 + 83)
+dj2(16 + 64 + 302   153   84)
i
:
The sign of 	 is generally positive except for the case where dj is extremely greater than di.
Actually, in the above equation of 	, only the two terms indicated by y1 and y2 are negative
and are both multiplied by 3d3j . For example, if di = 1 and  = 1, then dj  102 is sucient
for 	 > 0. If di = 1 and  = 0:5, then dj  296 is sucient for 	 > 0. It proves assertion (a).
Comparing cWLi with cWNi , we have
cWLi  cWNi = (2dj + 2di   1)21 + 2dj(1 + ) + didj(2 + )26 + 3d2i dj + 4dj(4 + 2dj + ) + di9 + 6 + 4dj(3 + dj +    2)  0;
which proves assertion (b). 
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